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Abstract 
 
 
Many people in the European Union fear that Eastern Enlargement leads to major job losses. 
More recently, these fears about job losses have extended to high skill labor and IT jobs. The 
paper examines with unique firm level data whether these fears are justified for the two 
neighboring countries of Eastern Enlargement Austria and Germany. We find that Eastern 
Enlargement leads to surprising small job losses of less than 0.5 percent of total employment 
in Germany and of 1.5 percent in Austria, because jobs in Eastern Europe do not compete 
with jobs in Austria and Germany. Low cost jobs of affiliates in Eastern Europe help Austrian 
and German firms to stay competitive in an increasingly competitive environment. However, 
we also find that multinational firms in Austria and Germany are outsourcing skill intensive 
activities to Eastern Europe taking advantage of cheap abundant skilled labor there. We find 
that the firms’ outsourcing activities to Eastern Europe are a response to a human capital scar-
city in Austria and Germany which has become particularly severe in the 1990s. We indeed 
find a reverse pattern of ‘Maquiladoras’ emerging with Eastern Enlargement  in Austria and 
Germany compared to what economists have found for the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Skilled workers in Austria and Germany are losing from outsourcing. In both 
countries outsourcing contributes 35 percent and 41 percent, respectively, to changes in rela-
tive wages for skilled workers in Austria and Germany.  To address the skill exodus to East-
ern Europe we suggest liberalizing the movement of high skill labor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Many people in the European Union fear that Eastern Enlargement leads to major job losses 
in the member countries, in particular in Austria and Germany as the two most important 
neighbors of Eastern Enlargement. More recently, in Germany these fears about job losses to 
the accession countries have extended to high skill labor and IT jobs. German firms are seen 
to outsource the skill intensive stages of production to Eastern Europe leading to an exodus of 
firms and high skill jobs to Eastern Europe. Are these fears justified? 
 
To address these questions the paper makes use of new survey data of 660 German and Aus-
trian firms with 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe during the period 1990 to 2001. 
The new survey data represent 100 percent of Austrian and 80 percent of German direct in-
vestment in Eastern Europe. 
 
The paper is discussing three issues. First, I examine whether Eastern Europe has become a 
new member in the new international division of labor which has characterized the world 
economy in the last two decades. Is Eastern Europe becoming an important location for firms’ 
international organization of production? (section 4) Then I examine whether an exodus of 
jobs to Eastern Europe has, in fact, taken place. Has Eastern Enlargement encouraged the re-
location of firms to Eastern Europe substituting cheap Eastern workers for costly German or 
Austrian workers? (section 5) Third, I look at whether it is indeed the case that the high skill 
jobs are moving to the East as is repeatedly argued in the public press in Germany (section 6). 
Is a reverse pattern of ‘Maquiladoras’ emerging after Eastern Enlargement? (section 7). Lastly 
I discuss some of the proposals made to address the problem of firms’ outsourcing of high 
skilled labor. In particular I show that subsidizing R&D activity in Germany or Austria to 
prevent the skill exodus to Eastern Europe will exacerbate the problem. I then suggest to im-
mediately liberalize the movement of skilled workers with Eastern Enlargement to address the 
human capital crisis in Germany and Austria.  
 
  
2. Trade and Investment Integration with Eastern Europe 
 
 
Since the fall of communism trade integration with Eastern Europe has taken place on a fast 
pace in both countries.  In 2006 14.7 percent of Germany’s and 20.6 percent of Austria’s ex-
ports are going to Eastern Europe and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and 15 
percent of both countries imports are coming from this region.  
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1990 2001 2006 1990 2001 2006 1990 2001 2006 1990 2001 2006
in percent 1
CEE 5.0 12.2 12.8 2.5 9.7 9.6 3.0 7.8 9.4 2.8 8.8 9.8
SEE 3.2 2.8 4.4 0.2 1.2 2.4 1.8 1.0 1.6 1.8 0.7 1.0
CIS 2.2 1.8 3.4 1.8 2.2 3.0 4.1 2.4 3.7 3.2 3.2 4.8
Total 10.4 16.8 20.6 6.8 13.1 15.1 8.9 11.2 14.7 7.7 12.7 15.6
Source: Statistik Austria, Statistisches Bundesamt
1 of total Austrian and German exports or imports, respectively
Export Share
Note: CEE includes Baltic States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Solvak Republic, and Slovenia; SEE includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia; and CIS includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Taijkistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Table 1.    Trade Integration with Eastern Europe
Austria
Import Share
Germany
Import ShareExport Share
 
 
 
average average average average average average
1992-1994 2000-2002 2005-2007 2008 1992-1994 1999-2001 2005-2007 2008
FDI to EE in percent of total FDI 34.1 87.7 58.3 50.3 5.4 2.4 13.0 10.2
CEE 94.8 81.0 11.5 30.1 90.7 83.6 43.3 43.6
Czech Republic 29.0 16.7 12.1 10.3 32.8 18.1 8.4 15.0
Hungary 52.9 23.1 10.4 14.9 36.9 12.5 9.7 8.9
Poland 1.7 7.6 -18.6 3.0 16.7 27.9 21.0 12.5
Slovak Republic 5.2 24.3 4.7 -0.3 3.4 22.9 3.9 2.3
Slovenia 5.8 9.1 2.9 2.2 0.3 0.9 1.1 -0.1
Baltic States 0.1 0.2 - - 0.7 1.2 -0.8 4.9
SEE 4.1 12.2 69.7 32.7 3.1 16.0 15.5 12.6
Bulgaria 0.6 1.1 10.5 10.9 3.2 1.2 1.7 4.9
Croatia 2.9 8.0 15.1 7.8 1.0 12.0 1.7 1.1
Romania 0.5 3.2 36.6 9.4 0.5 3.1 9.7 4.9
CIS 0.5 6.2 18.8 37.2 4.0 7.4 41.3 43.8
Russia 0.5 5.3 12.5 14.7 2.7 7.0 26.6 32.8
Ukraine 0.0 0.8 6.2 22.5 1.3 0.4 14.5 10.6
Source: Austrian National Bank, German National Bank, and UNCTAD (2000).
1 in percent of total outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Eastern Europe
Germany 
Table 2.    Investment Integration with Eastern Europe
Outgoing FDI1Outgoing FDI1
Austria 
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During the 1990s investment integration with Eastern Europe has been much more pro-
nounced than trade integration, in particular in Austria. In 2000-2002 Eastern Europe ac-
counts for 88 percent of total outgoing investment in Austria, while the share of Eastern 
Europe in Germany’s foreign investment is 2 percent only.  Thus, with the opening up of 
Eastern Europe Austria has concentrated almost all its outgoing investment to this region, 
while on a global scale Eastern Europe is of little importance as a host region for Germany 
(see Table 2). Nevertheless, Germany and Austria are the most important investors in this 
region. Both countries account for around 50 percent of total incoming foreign investment in 
Croatia and Slovenia and for around 40 percent of total incoming investment in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic (see Marin, Lorentowicz, Raubold 2002). More 
recently, however, both countries expanded their investment activity to Russia and SEE at the 
expense of CEE. As a result, Eastern Europe has become more important as a location for 
Germany (its share increased from 2.4 percent in 1999-2001 to 13 percent in 2005-2007) 
while less important for Austria (its share declined from 88 percent in 2000-2002 to 58 per-
cent in 2005-2007).    
 
 
3. The Data 
 
 
The firm survey among German and Austrian investors in Eastern Europe has been conducted 
in the years 1997-2001 in Germany and 1999-2001 in Austria. The sample consists of 2200 
investment projects by 660 Austrian and German firms during the period 1990 to 2001. In 
terms of value the 1200 German investment projects represent 80 percent of total German 
investment in Eastern Europe, while the 1000 Austrian investment projects represent 100 per-
cent of total Austrian investment in Eastern Europe. The data cover the period of 1990-2001, 
but the actual numbers are from the years 1997-2000 in Germany and 1999-2000 in Austria.  
 
Under communism no foreign direct investments in Eastern Europe have taken place due to a 
political ownership constraint.  Thus, when we started the firm survey among German and 
Austrian firms with investments in Eastern Europe, we were in the unique situation to go for 
detailed information on each foreign investment project in Eastern Europe and at the same 
time to aim for a full population sample. The result is a data set that allows us to say some-
thing representative about how foreign direct investment and outsourcing to Eastern Europe 
affect the Austrian and German economy. At the same time,  the data also allow us to say 
something representative of how incoming foreign investment is affecting Eastern Europe, 
because Austria and Germany are such important investors in this region. 
 
The questionnaire of the survey comes in three parts: information on parent firms in Austria 
and Germany, information on the actual investment project, and information on Eastern Euro-
pean affiliates and their environment. A parent firm may undertake more than one investment 
in Eastern Europe. In the sample the Austrian investor has undertaken 4 to 5 investments and 
the German investor 2 to 3 investments in Eastern Europe on average. Due to the length of the 
questionnaire (we collected information on about 500 variables) we personally visited the 
parent firms in Austria and Germany, respectively or conducted the interview by phone. Very 
few questionnaires have been sent out by mail and have been filled out anonymously. The 
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sample is unique in several dimensions. First, it includes detailed information on parent firms 
in Austria and Germany, like balance sheet data, the internal organization of the multinational 
enterprise, its global network, the incentive system used for its workers, power relations be-
tween parent and affiliates etc. Second, it contains information about how and where the in-
vestment is financed. Third, it includes information on affiliates in Eastern Europe like own-
ership structure, type of ownership, financial structure, competitive environment, parent and 
affiliate trade relations etc. The sample consists of quantitative as well as qualitative informa-
tion.  
 
 
4. A New Member in the Global Division of Labor?  
 
 
Is Eastern Enlargement offering Eastern Europe the prospect of becoming a new member in 
the new international division of labor? If yes, what kind of firm activity is transferred to 
Eastern Europe? In the last two decades the world economy has gone through a dramatic 
change. A new international division of labor is emerging in the world economy.  The global 
firm produces one input in one location which is then send for refinement to a second loca-
tion. The refined input then gets further refinement in a third location. Thus, firms geographi-
cally separate different production stages across the world economy to exploit differences in 
production costs.1 Take the example of the German firm Siemens. As other global corpora-
tions, Siemens has organized its activities in a global value chain with its R&D and engineer-
ing activity located in Europe and the US, procurement and logistics located in South East 
Asia, its assembly activity located in Eastern Europe, and its marketing activity organized on 
the local market or via the internet.2 Is this organizational pattern a more general trend among 
firms in Austria and Germany, respectively and is Eastern Europe becoming an important 
location for these firms in their global organization of production?  
 
In other words, why do German and Austrian firms invest in Eastern Europe (EE)? Do they 
want to replicate their production facilities in the countries in EE or do they want to exploit 
differences in factor costs between Germany and Austria on the one hand and EE on the 
other? The former is a horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) and is primarily motivated 
to gain access to the host country market. The latter is a vertical FDI and is motivated by 
wage differentials.3 One reason why we might be interested to distinguish between these two 
forms of multinational activity is to identify their potential effects on wage inequality and 
employment levels in Austria and Germany.  
 
 
                                                          
1 The new features of globalization are described in the Globalization Report to the European Commission, see  
Bourguignon et al 2002. 
2 See Financial Times Deutschland , 12. December 2003, and Sorg, Armin, Erwartungen und Erfahrungen eines 
Großunternehmens: Das Beispiel der Siemens AG, Ökonomische Konsequenzen einer EU-Osterweiterung, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Digitale Bibliothek, Bonn  2001. 
3 For the theory of vertical FDI, see Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985), for theories of horizontal 
FDI, see Brainard (1993, 1997), Markusen and Venables (2000). 
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Figure 1. Comparative Advantage with Eastern Europe 
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Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw); Statistisches Bundesamt; Statistik Austria; Chair of International Economics, 
University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
1) outsourcing: average wage (wage bill per employee) in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
offshoring: average wage (wage bill per employee) of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for 
Austria in 1999-2000 and for Germany in 1997-2000
2) outsourcing: GDP per employment in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001.
offshoring: sales per employee of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for Austria in 1999-2000 and 
for Germany in 1997-2000
3) outsourcing: wage bill divided by GDP in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
offshoring: wage bill divided by sales of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for Austria in 1999-
2000 and for Germany in 1997-2000
CEE includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary; SEE includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Republic of Macedonia, Romania; CIS includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, Russia, Tadzhikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus
1) 1)
2) 2)
3) 3)
 
 
 
 
When multinational firms wish to exploit differences in factor costs in Eastern Europe how 
much in terms of labor costs can they save when establishing an affiliate in Eastern Europe? 
In Figure 1 we compare relative wages, relative productivity, and relative unit labor costs be-
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tween Austria and Germany on the one hand and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), Southern 
Eastern Europe (SEE), and the countries of the former Soviet Union (CIS) on the other. We 
focus first on Germany. It appears from the left panel of Figure 1 that wages in CEE are about 
23 percent of those in Germany, while these countries’ productivity has reached about 23 per-
cent of Germany’s productivity level. As a result, labor unit costs in CEE countries are the 
same as in Germany. Thus, when German firms buy input goods in one of the countries in 
CEE they do not save on costs for the input good compared to when the input is produced in 
Germany.  
 
Can these costs be reduced when multinational firms open an affiliate in one of the CEE 
countries and produce the input themselves?  Figure 1 reveals that German affiliates in CEE 
pay 16.5 percent of their German parent wages but are increasing their productivity to 60 per-
cent of the parents’ productivity level.  Therefore, they can reduce the labor costs by 72.4 per-
cent relative to their parent firms’ cost in Germany.  
 
In the SEE countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) both wages and productivity are low so 
that unit labor costs in the SEE countries are 91 percent of Germany’s unit labor costs. Fur-
thermore, these costs are not reduced by as much as in the CEE countries when German firms 
produce locally in the SEE countries (labor cost are reduced by 50 percent), since producing 
locally does not help to increase productivity as much as in the CEE countries.    
 
The picture looks different in the CIS countries. Relative wages in Russia and Ukraine are 5 
percent of Germany’s, while these countries have 8 percent of Germany’s productivity, so that 
their unit labor costs are 67 percent of Germany’s. However, when German firms produce 
locally in affiliates in the CIS they can save 73 percent of their labor costs due to lower wages 
of German affiliates in Russia and Ukraine.  
 
The right panel of Figure 1 gives similar numbers for Austria.  
 
 
But how important are each of these motivations – market seeking versus cost advantage 
seeking – for foreign direct investments in Eastern Europe? Are German and Austrian firms 
primarily moving their activities to Eastern Europe to exploit differences in factor prices or do 
they want to be close to the Eastern European market by producing locally?  
 
One way to answer this question is to look at the pattern of intra-firm trade. In Table 3 I use 
the pattern of intra-firm trade as a criterion whether German and Austrian foreign investments 
in Eastern Europe, respectively are market seeking or cost advantage seeking. I define a for-
eign investment in Eastern Europe as a multinational outsourcing activity driven to exploit 
differences in factor prices when parent firms in Austria and Germany, respectively export 
input goods to their affiliates in Eastern Europe as well as import these goods back from their 
affiliates in Eastern Europe after refinement. Thus, in an outsourcing activity affiliates in 
Eastern Europe do not produce exclusively for the local market. This way, multinational out-
sourcing involves an intra-firm export from the parent firm in Germany or Austria to their 
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affiliates in Eastern Europe as well as an intra-firm import from their affiliates in Eastern 
Europe to Germany or Austria. 4 
 
I focus first on Germany. From the right panel of Table 3 we see that on average 45 percent of 
all German investment to Eastern Europe fulfill these criteria and are outsourcing activities of 
German firms motivated by lower wages in Eastern Europe.  The importance of outsourcing 
investment becomes, however, much larger for individual Eastern European countries. Out-
sourcing dominates among German investment in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
and Romania (share of around 70 percent). It plays little role in Slovenia and Poland. When a  
tighter criterion for outsourcing is used requiring that parent firms import at least 20 percent 
of their Eastern European affiliates’ output rather than import at all, German multinationals 
outsourcing is reduced to 10 percent in the Czech Republic, to 7 percent in Russia and to 2 
percent in Ukraine. All the other numbers remain the same.  
 
Among Austrian multinationals the outsourcing activities to Eastern Europe are much less 
important. Only 17 percent of total Austrian investment to Eastern Europe is motivated by 
lower wages in Eastern Europe. But again the share varies considerably across individual 
countries in Eastern Europe. 68 percent of Austria’s investment in Russia and 42 percent of its 
investment in Poland are motivated by factor prices. These numbers are not changed when the 
stricter criterion for outsourcing is applied requiring parent firms to import at least 20 percent 
of their Eastern European affiliates’ output.  
 
 
                                                          
4 In the literature different definitions of  outsourcing have been used. Hummels et al (2001) use input-output 
tables at the industry level to calculate an index of vertical specialization. Vertical specialization is defined as the 
share of imported inputs which is reexported. Hanson et al (2001) use the notion of export platforms to calculate 
the share of exports in percent of affiliates’ output of US multinationals.  The criterion for outsourcing used here 
is somewhat more strict than those in the literature. It is more strict than Hummels et al’s measure of vertical 
specialization, since I include intra-firm inputs only, while Hummels et al include inputs also between independ-
ent firms. It is also more strict than Hanson et al’s concept of export platforms, since I require an import as well 
as an export between parent and affiliates and I include exports of  affiliates to parent firms only, while Hanson 
et all include all exports of affiliates whatever their destination in their measure of export platforms. 
 10
Baltic States 3 3.11 7 28.43
Czech Republic 36 11.73 77 75.95
Hungary 27 10.19 42 27.18
Poland 20 41.54 38 14.50
Slovak Republic 19 9.94 16 68.71
Slovenia 13 15.49 5 12.44
Bulgaria 4 2.99 9 71.94
Romania 14 24.20 19 63.68
other SEE 21 8.46 5 14.29
Russia 7 67.90 31 26.59
Ukraine 8 16.14 4 17.11
other CIS 3 3.72 24 49.36
2) of all foreign direct investments in respective Eastern European country.
1) parent firms export intermediate goods as well as import intermediate or final goods from their affiliates in Eastern Europe; A tighter 
criterion for outsourcing requiring that parent firms import at least 20 percent of their Eastern European affiliates' output (rather than 
import at all) reduces the German multinationals' outsourcing numbers for the Czech Republic to 10 percent, for Russia to 7 percent, and 
for Ukraine to 2 percent. All other numbers remain the same.
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
29.15
all transition countries 175 17.27 277 45.44
CIS 18 42.11 59
46.68
55.68SEE 39 12.06 33
CEE 118 17.12 185
Table 3.    Multinationals' Outsourcing Activity to Eastern Europe 1)
   Austrian Multinationals   German Multinationals
cases in percent 2) cases in percent 2)
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In sum, the pattern of vertical specialization that has emerged between Germany and Eastern 
Europe on the one hand and Austria and Eastern Europe on the other, suggests that some of 
the Eastern European countries like Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Romania, and 
Russia have clearly become new members in the international division of labor. 
 
 
5. An Exodus of Jobs? 
 
 
In the previous section we have documented that German and Austrian firms can save a sub-
stantial amount of labor costs (between 37 to 73 percent) by outsourcing activities to Eastern 
Europe. We also showed that in Germany 45 percent and in Austria 17 percent of investments 
in Eastern Europe are motivated by lower wages in Eastern Europe in which these firms out-
source labor intensive production stages to Eastern Europe. Does this imply that these out-
sourcing activities have caused major job losses in Germany and Austria, respectively? We 
first look at what firms themselves say they are doing and then turn to an econometric analy-
sis. 
 
 
5.1 What the Firms say … 
 
In this section we give a back on the envelope calculation of multinational job relocations to 
Eastern Europe based on what multinational corporations say they are doing. In the firm sur-
vey we ask firms to classify what motivated their investment to Eastern Europe and whether 
or not the investment is a relocation of production to Eastern Europe or created additional 
capacity in Eastern Europe beyond the production in Austria and Germany, respectively. The 
motivations considered are access to the Eastern European market, market size, lower produc-
tion costs, availability of well trained skilled labor, avoidance of transport costs and of ex-
change rate risk etc. In addition firms gave us information on how many jobs each of their 
investment created in Eastern Europe. A positive response to lower production costs and to 
offshore production in the survey together with the filled in information on jobs in Eastern 
Europe is then used to compute the job losses associated with offshore production in Austria 
and Germany, respectively. 
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Austria Germany Austria Germany
Relocation Induced Jobs 
due to:
offshore production -10,494 -115,698
low production costs -38,022 -117,074
intra-firm imports -57,833 -207,220
affiliate to parent productivity 0.61 0.56 0.77 0.43
Job Destruction -29,595 -130,352 -44,531 -89,105
Trade induced Jobs
due to:
induced exports to EE 7,157 36,606 2,951 53,607
induced imports from EE -4,901 -34,555 -5,433 -107,904
Job Creation 4,279 2,051 -2,482 -54,297
Net Job Destruction -25,316 -128,301 -47,013 -143,402
in percent of parent employment -1.72 -1.07 -3.19 -1.19
in percent of total employment -0.82 -0.38 -1.51 -0.42
Austria Germany
Total Affiliates Employment (survey) 201,795 463,550
Total Parent Employment 1,473,176 12,044,598
Total Employment 3,106,000 34,133,000
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
Notes:
offshore production: number of jobs created in Eastern European affiliates, when firms classified the investment as a relocation activity from Germany and 
Austria, respectively.
low production costs: number of jobs created in Eastern European affiliates, when investors ranked low production costs as decesive or important motivation for 
the investment.
affiliate to parent productivity: ratio of value added per employee in Eastern European affiliates to value added per employee in parent firms.
induced exports: number of jobs created in Austria and Germany, respectively, due to inputs delivered by parent firms to affiliates in EE. The value of inputs is 
divided by parent firms value added per worker to obtain the number of jobs created in Austria and Germany, respectively.
induced imports: number of jobs lost in Austria and Germany, respectively, due to intermediate and final goods sent by affiliates in Eastern Europe to parent 
firms. The value added of EE affiliates is divided by parent firms value added per worker to obtain the number of jobs lost in Austria and Germany, respectively.
intra-firm imports: number of jobs created in Eastern European affiliates, when parent firms in Germany and Austria import inputs from their affiliates in 
Eastern Europe.
subjective measure objective measure
number of jobs
Table 4.    Multinationals' Job Relocations to Eastern Europe
 
 
 
The calculation of job losses based on this ‘subjective measure’ is given in Table 4. German 
multinationals have created 463.550 jobs and Austrian multinationals 201.795 jobs in Eastern 
Europe. According to our calculation these newly created jobs in Eastern Europe have led to a 
direct loss of 128.301 jobs in Germany and 25.316 jobs in Austria due to multinational reloca-
tions to Eastern Europe. These figures are obtained by computing the jobs created by German 
firms in Eastern Europe when investors have given low costs or outsourcing as the prime mo-
tivation for the investment. Out of this motivation German firms have created 232,772 jobs in 
Eastern Europe, which accounts for 50 percent of total German affiliates’ employment in 
Eastern Europe. Note however, that German affiliates in Eastern Europe have on average 56 
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percent of the productivity level of their parent firms only. Therefore, one job created in East-
ern Europe is equivalent to a 0.56 job lost in Germany implying a relocation induced job de-
struction of 130.352 jobs in Germany.  
 
But the opening of a subsidiary in Eastern Europe creates new trading opportunities. German 
parent firms typically deliver inputs for further refinement to their affiliates in Eastern 
Europe. These intra firm exports to EE create 36.606 jobs in Germany. The number is ob-
tained by computing the number of jobs created in Germany, respectively due to inputs deliv-
ered by parent firms to affiliates in Eastern Europe. To compute the number of jobs created in 
Germany we divide the value of inputs send to affiliates in Eastern Europe by the parents’ 
value added per worker. Thus, 36.606 workers in Germany were used to produce the value of 
inputs send to Eastern European affiliates. 
 
Eastern European affiliates, in turn, deliver refined inputs or final goods back to parent com-
panies. These intra firm imports from EE destroy 34.555 jobs in Germany. Again this number 
is obtained by computing the number of jobs destroyed in Germany due to EE affiliates’ de-
livery of goods to parent firms in Germany. The value added of Eastern European affiliates is 
divided by parent firms’ value added per worker. Thus, 34.555 workers are not used in Ger-
man production, because the value added is produced by Eastern European affiliates. The de-
scribed intra-firm exports and imports lead to a net trade induced job creation of 2.051 jobs. 
This adds up to a net destruction of 128.301 jobs in Germany.  
 
An analogous computation results in a net destruction of 25.316 jobs in Austria. It is interest-
ing to note that Austrian firms create 48.516 jobs in Eastern Europe out of a cost saving moti-
vation, which accounts for 24 percent of total Austrian affiliate’s employment in Eastern 
Europe. This is half as much as in Germany where 50 percent of affiliates’ jobs in Eastern 
Europe are created out of cost considerations.5 Taking the productivity differential between 
parent and affiliates and intra firm trade into account the job creation in Eastern Europe trans-
lates into a destruction of  25.316 jobs in Austria. 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 gives an analogous calculation of job losses based on an ‘objective 
measure’ rather than on the relocation motive given by firms. In the ‘objective measure’ for 
an outsourcing investment we require that parent firms in Austria and Germany import input 
goods from their affiliates in Eastern Europe. Here we find that 207.220 jobs have been cre-
ated in Eastern Europe by German firms which results in a job destruction of  89.105 which 
leads to a net destruction of 143.402 jobs in Germany because the trade induced job losses are 
much larger with this measure of outsourcing. The calculation based on the ‘objective meas-
ure’ gives job losses of 47.013 in Austria.     
 
The computation in Table 4 is a rough calculation and has to be taken for what it is. Thus, the 
computed job numbers have to be interpreted with caution. In particular, the calculation has 
                                                          
5 This is consistent with the findings of the previous section that outsourcing activities dominate among German 
investment, but not among Austrian investment in Eastern Europe. One reason for this difference between Ger-
many and Austria is the different pattern of specialization of German and Austrian investment in Eastern Europe. 
Germany is predominantly engaged in machinery and transport with 90 percent of outsourcing investment, while 
Austria is predominantly involved in banking with 30 percent of outsourcing investment. 
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the following shortcomings. The calculation assumes that one job lost at the level of the firm 
translates into one job lost to the economy as a whole. Thus, the computation ignores any 
general equilibrium effects. Typically, when workers loose their jobs at one particular firm, 
they are reemployed at some other firms with an accompanied adjustment in wages.  Ignoring 
such general equilibrium effects may be justified when wages are not allowed to adjust due to 
labor market rigidities. Figure 2 of section 7 indeed shows that relative wages remained more 
or less fixed in both countries during the 1990s suggesting that these general equilibrium ef-
fects could not fully work themselves through the system. Thus, applying the 1 to 1 assump-
tion does not seem to be completely unrealistic for Austria and Germany.   In any case, the 
computation results in stronger job losses in Germany and Austria, respectively than would 
have taken place otherwise with flexible wages when general equilibrium effects are taken 
into account and thus can be seen to represent an upper bound of the true job losses due to 
outsourcing.    
 
The computed losses of 128.301 (143.402) jobs in Germany and of 25.316 (47.013) jobs in 
Austria account for about 0.4 percent and 0.8 percent of total employment in Germany and 
Austria, respectively with the subjective measure of outsourcing and of 0.4 and 1.5 percent in 
Germany and Austria with the objective measure of outsourcing.  These are indeed small 
numbers.   
 
Why are these job losses so surprisingly low? To get to an answer we turn now to an econo-
metric analysis of multinational’s labor demand.  
 
 
5.2 An Econometric Analysis 
 
In this section I examine whether and how multinationals’ labor demand across locations is 
related by estimating labor demand functions of German and Austrian parent firms. Does the 
multinational firm in Austria and Germany, respectively reduce labor demand in the Austrian 
and German labor market when wages in their affiliates in Eastern Europe decline? In this 
case cheaper labor in Eastern Europe substitutes for expensive labor in Austria and Germany. 
 
Consider a firm producing in a number of countries. The firm that can decompose production 
across borders maximizes global profits. Global profits are the sum of revenues across loca-
tions of production minus production costs. The firm chooses a vertical decomposition of 
production to optimize over relative wages leading to complementarity in labor demands be-
tween locations. Thus, the location of production stages depends on relative wages if trade 
barriers are not prohibitive. Assembly is produced in the low wage location if there is intra-
firm trade. In a simple two country case, the parent’s labor demand iL  can be expressed as  
 
 
(1)                                              jjiijjiiii YYwwL γγββα ++++=                     
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The multinational’s reduced form labor demand for a given affiliate location j is the weighted 
sum of labor costs w and demand conditions Y across locations.6 The focus of our empirical 
analysis is to estimate the cross-elasticity of labor demand jβ . If production is vertically de-
composed then the parent’s labor demand will be decreasing in the wage in its loca-
tion, 0<iβ , decreasing in the wage of its affiliate location 0<jβ , increasing in local de-
mand 0>jγ , and  increasing in foreign demand 0>jγ . On the other hand, if production is 
not vertically decomposed, then 0≥jβ . With 0<jβ , multinationals are linked internationally 
at the firm level through trade in intermediate and final goods.  As a result of those trade links 
affiliate jobs are complements rather than substitutes for parent firm jobs.  
 
We estimate a log-linear version of the parent’s labor demand equation (1) using ordinary 
least squares based on our firm survey data of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 
660 firms in Austria and Germany.  The data are at the firm level and are a cross section for 
the years 1997 – 2000 in Germany and for the years 1999 – 2000 in Austria covering the pro-
duction activity of German and Austrian affiliates in all countries of Eastern Europe including 
the former Soviet Union. Equation 1 includes industry dummies to account for firm heteroge-
neity as well as time dummies for the years 1997 – 2000 in Germany and for the years 1999 – 
2000 in Austria to control for time fixed effects.7 Due to data problems we will not distinguish 
between workers by skill level, because we do not observe wages for skills at the firm level. 
Wages w are average Euro denominated compensations per employee and Y  are sales of par-
ent firms in Austria and Germany and their affiliates in Eastern Europe. The independent 
variable parent employment iL  is number of workers of parent firms in Austria and Germany, 
respectively. 
 
We estimate the model of multinational labor demand separately for affiliates in CEE, SEE 
and the CIS allowing the slope terms β  and γ  to vary across these regions. 
 
 
                                                          
6 For the model, see Riker and Brainard (1997). 
7 We are not too worried about the potential problem of endogeneity of the independent variables firm wages and 
firm output, since the time dimension of the data set is limited. The data cover the period 1990 to 2001, but the 
actual figures are for the years 1997 to 2000 for Germany and 1999 to 2000 for Austria. A possible problem of 
endogeneity may arise when wages in Eastern Europe affiliates increase and wages of parent firms decline due to 
firms relocation of production towards Eastern Europe.     
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CEE SEE CIS CEE SEE CIS
dependent variable: log parent employment
log parent output 0.88* 0.95* 1.11* 0.96* 0.97* 1.09*
(31.08) (14.72) (11.12) (35.33) (7.48) (26.03)
log parent wage -0.86* -0.86* -2.20* -0.48* -0.76* -0.38
(7.80) (2.72) (4.91) (7.21) (2.23) (1.42)
log affiliate output -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07* -0.13 0.00
(1.46) (0.70) (1.45) (2.17) (0.97) (0.07)
log affiliate wage -0.16* -0.04 0.08 -0.16* 0.14 -0.12
(2.77) (0.43) (0.67) (3.34) (0.73) (1.83)
constant 1.51 -1.47 10.47* -4.33* -2.37 -9.21*
(1.14) (0.42) (2.31) (4.90) (0.52) (3.53)
corr. R2 0.786 0.829 0.921 0.844 0.825 0.949
number of oberservations 401 90 35 311 38 62
t-values are reported in parentheses.
* significant at the 5% percent level
Table 5.     Parent Labour Demand Equation
Austria Germany
Note: Estimates are for a cross section of parent firms and their affiliates in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), Southern Eastern 
Europe (SEE) and the former Soviet Union (CIS) of the years 1997-2000 in Germany and 1999-2000 in Austria. Estimation is 
based on equation (1) and are OLS estimates including industry fixed effects and time dummies for the years 1997-2000 for 
Germany and 1999-2000 for Austria. 
 
 
 
The results of estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 5. Table 5 gives Austrian and 
German parent companies’ labor demand, respectively for the accession countries CEE, the 
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candidate countries of the second round SEE, and the countries of the former Soviet Union 
CIS. The estimated employment demand functions show that a 10 percent decline in affiliate 
wages in CEE countries leads to a 1.6 percent increase rather than decline in the parent com-
pany’s employment demand in both Austria and Germany, respectively.   These estimates 
suggest that the outsourcing activity of German and Austrian firms to the accession countries 
has actually helped to create jobs in Austria and Germany, respectively. Outsourcing some of 
the firm’s activities to their CEE countries affiliates has helped Austrian and German firms to 
save between 65 to 80 percent of their labor costs (see Figure 1) helping these firms to stay 
competitive in an increasingly competitive environment. Rather than competing with each 
other as alternative suppliers of the same final goods, affiliates in the CEE countries comple-
ment each other by supplying different components of the same final good.  
 
The picture looks different for the SEE countries. In the SEE countries affiliates’ wages ap-
pear not to play any role for the parent firms’ labor demand in Austria and Germany, respec-
tively. At first, this seems surprising given the relative low wages in these countries. A look at 
Figure 1 offers, however, an answer. German and Austrian affiliates in these countries are not 
able to increase the productivity level as much beyond the country as a whole when producing 
locally. Therefore, outsourcing to the SEE countries does not offer the prospect of lowering 
German and Austrian firms’ overall production costs as much as in the CEE countries. As an 
outsourcing location the SEE countries appear to be less attractive.  
 
The picture looks again different for the CIS countries. Austria’s and Germany’s multination-
als appear to follow a diverse strategy in these markets. German multinationals use the CIS 
countries to lower their overall production costs. A decline in CIS affiliate wages increases 
the German parent’s labor demand. The relationship is significant at the 10 percent level. 
Austrian multinationals, however, appear to substitute cheap labor in the CIS for expensive 
labor in Austria. However, the relationship is not significant at conventional levels. 
 
 
In sum, job losses of Austrian and German investment in Eastern Europe appear low because 
of two reasons. First, in Austria horizontal investment driven by market seeking considera-
tions dominate among investment in Eastern Europe. Second, among vertical investment 
driven by differences in factor prices affiliate jobs in Eastern Europe appear not to compete 
with jobs in Austria and Germany. German and Austrian firms increase their production and 
employment demand in Germany and Austria when workers in their affiliates in the CEE 
countries become less costly. Lower costs of Eastern European affiliates help firms to lower 
overall productions costs and to stay competitive. This appears to be the reason why the job 
losses of Austrian and German investment in Eastern Europe are so strikingly low.8  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Riker and Brainard (1997), Brainard and Riker (1997) get very similar results for US multinational firms’ in-
vestment strategy in face of  NAFTA; see also Braconnier and Eckholm (2000) for Swedisch multinationals in 
Eastern Europe, and Becker et al …… 
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6. A Human Capital Crisis? 
 
 
In recent months a new concern has been raised by economic experts in Germany. German 
firms are now outsourcing headquarter activities to Eastern Europe. Germany is now loosing 
the good jobs, the high skilled, R&D and IT jobs, not just the bad, low skilled jobs. Siemens, 
for example, announced in an interview with Financial Times Germany that it plans to out-
source 1/3 of its R&D activity to subsidiaries located in low wage countries like India, China, 
or Russia. It also plans to centralize and outsource some of its headquarter activities like ac-
counting and personnel management to Siemens subsidiaries in the Czech Republic. Siemens 
praised the high quality of skilled workers in Eastern Europe.  Armin Sorg, the Chief Econo-
mist of Siemens argued at a conference on the Economic Consequences of Eastern Enlarge-
ment of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, that Eastern Europe is a particularly attractive location 
for Siemens compared to India and China, because of its proximity to Germany and because 
of the same culture and time zone.9 Similarly, Bank Austria has started to outsource mathe-
matical software development and other headquarter activities to Russia. Are these corporate 
inversions of firm activities taking place at Siemens and Bank Austria only or are they a more 
general trend among multinational firms in Germany and Austria? 10 
 
 
                                                          
9 See Financial Times Deutschland , 12. December 2003, and Sorg, Armin, Erwartungen und Erfahrungen eines 
Großunternehmens: Das Beispiel der Siemens AG, Ökonomische Konsequenzen einer EU-Osterweiterung, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Digitale Bibliothek, Bonn 2001. 
10 The trend of corporate inversions has been observed in the US as well where US  firms outsource IT jobs and 
other headquarter activity to India and partly China, see The Economist, January 2004.   
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We can answer this question by looking at the number of skilled jobs German and Austrian 
firms are creating in their affiliates in Eastern Europe. How skill intensive is the activity un-
dertaken by German and Austrian affiliates in Eastern Europe compared to their parent activ-
ity in Germany and Austria? Table 6 gives the relevant numbers for Germany. 
 
I use two indicators to measure the skill intensity of German affiliates in Eastern Europe: the 
share of workers with a university or college degree and the share of personnel engaged in 
R&D or engineering activities in the manufacturing and service sector. The data suggest that 
the high skill ratios of affiliates (the number of university or college workers in percent of 
total affiliate workers) are 2 to 3 times as large as that of German parent firms in all three re-
gions CEE, SEE, and CIS. The share of university or college graduates among affiliate work-
ers in Eastern Europe varies between 86 percent (Czech Republic) and 8 percent (Slovenia). 
The most skill intensive activity is undertaken by affiliates in the Czech Republic (skill share 
of 86 percent), in Russia (skill share of 63 percent), in Croatia and Slovakia (skill share of 40 
percent). This compares with an average share of university or college graduates of German 
parent firms of 18 percent only. Thus, measured by the number of university and college 
graduates, German affiliates in Bulgaria are 12 times as skill intensive than their German par-
ent firms, affiliates in the Czech Republic 5.5 times as skill intensive, affiliates in Russia 2.9 
times as skill intensive. Only affiliates in Hungary have a skill share below that of German 
parent firms.  
 
A similar picture emerges when the skill intensity of German affiliates is measured by the 
share of workers engaged in R&D and engineering (see Table 6). The R&D personnel ratios 
of affiliates in Eastern Europe range between 4.0 percent (Slovakia) and 27.8 percent (Croatia 
and Russia). This compares with an average R&D personnel share of 13.6 percent of German 
parent firms. Thus, German affiliates in Russia are 2.9 times as R&D intensive as their Ger-
man parent firms, affiliates in the Czech Republic and Croatia 1.7 times as R&D intensive, 
and affiliates in Ukraine 1.4 as research intensive. The remaining countries affiliates’ R&D 
intensity is below that of German parent firms.  
 
In Table 6 I look at Austria’s export of high skill jobs to Eastern Europe. It appears from the 
Table that the share of university and college graduate workers in percent of Austrian affili-
ates’ workers in Eastern Europe range between 9.6 percent (Romania) and 34.8 percent (Rus-
sia) compared to a skill share of 14.7 percent of Austrian parent firms. Thus, only affiliates in 
Slovenia have a smaller employment share of university and college graduates compared to 
Austrian parent firms. Affiliates in Bulgaria employ 26 times as many university graduates 
compared to the Austrian parent company, affiliates in Ukraine 19 times, affiliates in Russia 
and Romania 3.7 times as many university graduates compared to Austrian parent firms. Al-
though the R&D ratios of Austrian affiliates are extremely high and much larger than that of 
German affiliates in Eastern Europe (they range between 3.8 percent in affiliates in the Baltic 
States to 45.8 percent in affiliates in Russia given in Table 6), none of the Austrian affiliates’ 
research and engineering activities in Eastern Europe exceed that of their Austrian parent 
firms with the exception of those in Russia. The reason for this is the extremely high R&D 
intensity of parent firms in Austria. The high R&D intensity of parent firms in Austria appears 
large indeed since they exceed that of German parent firms. This is quite striking. 
 
 21
One possible reason for this result is economic policy. The Austrian government gives strong 
tax incentives and subsidies to R&D activity which might have made firms to move more into 
this activity in Austria and to locate less of this activity in Eastern Europe. 11 One indication 
that the large R&D ratios of parent firms in Austria are induced by policy is the diverse pat-
tern between the skill personnel ratios and the R&D ratios of Austrian affiliates in Eastern 
Europe. Typically, when the government subsidizes R&D, the R&D sector expands and com-
petes with other sectors for skilled workers.  However, when firms have the option to out-
source some of the activities to Eastern Europe which use skilled workers but which do not 
qualify for a domestic R&D subsidy (such as high tech activity in other sectors), they can 
avoid competing for talent in the local labor market. 12 
 
Take the example of Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria as outsourcing locations. Austrian affili-
ates in Bulgaria and Ukraine employ 26 to 19 times as many skilled workers in production 
than their parent firms in Austria, but only 0.27 and 0.14 times as many skilled workers in 
research and engineering. A similar but less striking picture emerges in Russia. Austrian af-
filiates in Russia use 3.7 times as many skilled workers in production and the same amount of 
skilled workers in R&D activity as Austrian parent firms. German affiliates in Russia use 
about the same skill intensity in production as well as research (see Table 6). In sum, affiliate 
activities of Austrian multinationals in Eastern Europe appear to be more skill intensive in 
terms of their share of university and college workers but less skill intensive in terms of their 
R&D intensity, although the R&D ratios of Austrian affiliates in some of the Eastern Euro-
pean countries turn out to be extremely large. 
 
 
These are striking and puzzling numbers. German and Austrian multinationals tend to out-
source the most skill and R&D intensive activities to Eastern Europe. Why is this happening? 
Economic theory guides us to look at the factor endowment of these countries for an answer. 
If countries outsource the most skill intensive activities to other countries, then these countries 
must be poorly endowed with skills relative to their trading partners.13   Table 7 documents 
Germany’s and Austria’s endowment with skills compared to Eastern Europe. It appears from 
the table that the Baltic States, Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria are the most skill rich countries 
as measured by the share of the labor force with a tertiary education level. Germany’s educa-
tion level lies below the OECD average and roughly matches that of the CEE countries aver-
age. In particular, Germany is less skill rich than the Baltic States, Russia, and Hungary. In 
this ranking of countries Austria turns out to be one of the most skill poor countries. 14   
 
 
                                                          
11 Moreover, Austria has one of highest share of state financed R&D, see Marin (1995).  
12 For Austria’s R&D and technology policy and its effects see Marin (1995).  
13 For a theory of multinational investment based on factor endowment differences between countries, see Help-
man (1984). 
14 These numbers do not say much about the quality of education in these countries. The numbers are quantita-
tive measures of formal education only.   
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1998 2007 1998 2007
OECD high income countries3), average 0.16 0.26 0.77 0.74
      Austria 0.07 0.18 0.91 0.82
      Germany 0.15 0.24 0.76 0.76
      France 0.24 0.29 0.76 0.71
      Sweden 0.13 0.30 0.72 0.69
      Finland 0.12 0.35 0.78 0.65
      Netherlands 0.26 0.324) 0.74 0.68
      United Kingdom 0.15 0.32 0.75 0.67
      Italy 0.10 0.16 0.90 0.84
      Norway 0.17 0.33 0.69 0.67
      Japan 0.19 0.40 0.71 0.60
CEE5), average 0.14 0.23 0.74 0.77
      Baltic States 0.20 0.30 0.59 0.70
      Czech Republic 0.11 0.14 0.89 0.86
      Hungary 0.15 0.21 0.84 0.79
      Poland 0.11 0.22 0.85 0.78
      Slovakia 0.11 0.15 0.57 0.85
      Slovenia 0.07 0.22 0.86 0.78
SEE6), average 0.10 0.19 0.84 0.81
      Bulgaria 0.12 0.24 0.82 0.76
      Romania 0.08 0.13 0.88 0.87
      Croatia 0.10 0.18 0.83 0.82
Russia7) 0.18 0.53 0.49 0.47
Source: International Labor Organization
1) tertiary education (third level, first stage, leading to a first university degree or equivalent qualification + third level, 
 second stage, leading to a post-graduate university degree)
2) no schooling + first level + second level, first stage + second level, second stage
3) Austria, Germany, France, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway
4) 2008
5) Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia
6) Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania
7) In 2007 polytechnique schools have been included into tertiary education, while not being included before.
Table 7. Skill Endowment of Selected Countries
education levels in percent of the labour force 
high skill1) low skill2)
 
 
 
What has happened to the two countries, Austria and Germany, world famous as the ‘nations 
of poets and thinkers’ that both rank so low among the rich OECD countries? To understand 
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why Germany and Austria fare so poorly in an international comparison of skill endowment 
levels, we have to turn to history on the one hand and to the accumulation of skills in the post 
war period on the other. 
 
I have estimated in Marin (1995) that World War II and the mass killing of Jews in the holo-
caust has destroyed 30 percent of Austria’s human capital stock. A less conservative estimate 
by Stadler (1987) which includes the Jewish population which were not members of Jewish 
communities as well as the skilled non Jewish population which went into exile range the loss 
of Austria’s human capital stock at 67 percent. Most efforts in Austria in the post war period 
went into rebuilding the physical capital stock destroyed by World War II. But Austria never 
recovered from the destruction of its human capital stock, as the accumulation of skills in the 
post war period has not been able to make up for it. 15 
 
In Table 8 I look at the accumulation of skills in the post war period in the two countries. Ta-
ble 8 reports the annual growth rates of the human capital stock per person in the two coun-
tries for the period 1960 to 1997. This measure of human capital is obtained by aggregating 
five education levels using the market wage of each education level as a weight. The market 
wage of each education level, in turn, is estimated by a Mincer type wage equation which 
relates years of schooling to the hourly wage rate. 16  The table shows that human capital ac-
cumulation has dramatically slowed in the 1990s in both countries. In Germany the annual 
growth rate of the human capital stock per person declined from 0.75 percent in the 1980s to 
0.18 percent in the 1990s. This is a slow down in the annual growth rate by more than 2/3. In 
Austria, the annual growth rate of the skill stock more than halved between the 1980s and 
1990s from 0.37 percent to 0.15 percent. Thus, in the 1990s when trade integration with the 
former communist countries and the revolution of information technology both have put pres-
sure on the demand for skilled labor, the supply of skilled labor has almost come to a hold in 
both countries. This has generated a dramatic scarcity of human capital in both countries. 
 
 
                                                          
15 I am not aware of a similar estimate for Germany.  
16 For details on the estimation procedure see Koman and Marin (2000). 
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Austria Germany
1960-1980 0.45 0.85
1980-1990 0.37 0.75
1990-1997 0.15 0.18
1960-1997 0.37 0.69
Source: Koman and Marin (2000)
annual growth rates in percent
Table 8.  Human Capital Stock per Person
 
 
 
 
7. A Reverse Pattern of ‘Maquiladoras’ in Austria and Germany?  
 
These numbers suggest that the source of the problem is the relative scarcity of human capital 
in Germany and Austria. German and Austrian firms move the most skill intensive activities 
to Eastern Europe, because they cannot find the skilled workers in their home labor market. 
The skill move to Eastern Europe may explain why the wage gap between skilled and un-
skilled workers has remained constant over the 1990s in Germany in spite of the information 
revolution and trade integration with Eastern Europe. 
 
Figure 2 gives the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in the 1990s in Germany and Austria on 
the one hand and in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic on the other. We use as a proxy 
for the skill wage ratio relative wages of non-production to production workers. The data 
show a strong increase in the relative wage for skills in Poland and the other accession coun-
tries during the 1990s, while this ratio remained constant in Germany and declined somewhat 
in Austria. These data do not show a pattern of factor prices that trade economists usually 
expect from trade and investment integration. Take the example of Germany and Poland. 
Typically, when a skill rich country like Germany (relative to Poland)  integrates with a skill 
poor country like Poland (see Table 7), we expect relative wages for skills to go up in Ger-
many and to decline in Poland. The reason is that trade integration leads a country to special-
ize in those sectors which use the country’s abundant factor intensively. Thus, skill rich Ger-
many specializes in the skill intensive sectors and labor rich Poland specializes in labor inten-
sive sectors. As a result the relative demand for skills goes up in Germany and declines in 
Poland leading to an increase in the relative wage for skills in Germany and to a decline of 
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those in Poland.   By the same argument in skill poor Austria relative wages for skills are ex-
pected to decline with trade integration with Eastern Europe. 
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Why have relative wages for skilled workers increased in Eastern Europe and remained con-
stant in Austria and Germany? Why do we observe a perverse Stolper-Samuelson effect in 
these countries? Economic experts have explained the constancy of the wag gap in Germany 
and Austria in the 1990s by labor market rigidities. Labor market rigidities may explain why 
low skilled wages have not declined. But the puzzle remains. Why have skilled wages not 
increased in Germany and why have they not declined in Austria with trade integration with 
Eastern Europe?17 Lets first focus on Germany. Two easy answers for the constancy of the 
wage gap in Germany may be obtained from Tables 1, 2 and 7. First, Table 1 and 2 show hat 
the trade and investment shares with Eastern Europe are too small to have an impact on wage 
inequality in Germany. 18  But if this is the answer, why then have trade and investment inte-
gration with Eastern Europe not influenced wage inequality in Austria, where these shares are 
much larger? Second, Table 7 shows that Germany’s endowment with skills more or less 
matches the CEE countries’ average. Thus, relative factor prices may not have changed in 
Germany, because Germany’s trade integration with the CEE countries is integration among 
countries with similar factor endowments. But if this is the right answer, why then have rela-
tive wages for skills in the CEE countries not remained more or less the same as well? 19 
Something else must be at work here.  
 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) have argued in the context of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) that this perverse Stolper-Samuelson effect can be explained by capital 
movements in the form of foreign direct investment from the US to Mexico. US multination-
als started to outsource the more labor intensive stages of production to Mexico. The so called 
Maquiladoras emerged in Mexico. Maquiladoras are affiliates of US multinationals in Mexico 
which specialize in the low skill intensive part of the value chain. In their model a single 
manufactured good is produced from a continuum of intermediate inputs, which are in turn 
produced using skilled workers, unskilled workers, and capital. Assuming that trade does not 
lead to factor price equalization, the equilibrium is described by the labor rich South (Mexico) 
producing and exporting a range of inputs up to some critical ratio of skilled to unskilled la-
bor, with the skill rich North (US) producing the remainder of the inputs. The northern inputs 
include such activities as R&D and marketing, which use little or no unskilled labor, while the 
activities that are more intensive in unskilled labor are outsourced to the South. In this model 
US multinationals’ outsourcing activities to Mexico leads relative wages for skills to increase 
in the US as well as in Mexico. The reason is that the outsourced activity from the US to 
Mexico is less skilled labor intensive than what the US is now producing, but more skilled-
labor intensive than what Mexico used to produce. As a result relative demand for skilled la-
bor increases in both countries.  
 
The data I have just presented, however, suggest that with Eastern Enlargement a ‘Reverse        
Maquiladoras’ effect is in the process of emerging in Germany and Austria. German and Aus-
trian multinationals outsource the more skill intensive stages of production to Eastern Europe 
                                                          
17 Fersterer and Winter-Ebner (2003) actually find a slight decline in the return rates on education in Austria.  
18 see Krugman (1994) who argues that the trade shares with low wage countries in the US are much too small to 
explain the increase in wage inequality in the US. 
19 One could argue that the CEE countries’ transformation from a planned to a market economy has actually 
contributed to the increase in the wag gap in these countries. Lorentowicz, Marin, Raubold (2008) finds weak 
support for this for Poland.  
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(see Table 620) and specialize in the more labor intensive stages of production in Germany and 
Austria, respectively. Thus, firms in Germany and Austria are in the process of becoming the 
Maquiladoras of German and Austrian affiliates in Eastern Europe with a reversal of roles 
between headquarter and affiliate activities. The activities transferred by German and Aus-
trian multinationals to Eastern Europe are more skill intensive than those now produced in 
Germany and Austria, respectively. As a result, the relative demand for skilled labor declines 
in Germany and Austria. This way, firms’ outsourcing of high skill intensive activities to 
Eastern Europe has helped to ease the human capital crisis in Germany and Austria.  This may 
explain why relative wages for skills in Germany have not increased with the revolution of 
information technology in the 1990s as firms’ outsourcing activities have removed some of 
the demand pressure on skills from the German labor market. Whether relative wages for 
skills increase or decline in Eastern Europe  depends on whether or not the outsourcing activi-
ties transferred to Eastern Europe are more or less skill intensive than the activities formerly 
produced in Eastern Europe. The increases in relative wages for skills in Eastern Europe sug-
gest that the activities transferred from Germany and Austria, respectively are more skill in-
tensive than those formerly produced in Eastern Europe. 21  
 
In order to take a look at whether a ‘Reverse Maquiladoras’ effect is indeed at work in Austria 
and Germany we run the Feenstra and Hanson regressions for Austria, Germany, and Poland 
to examine the importance of outsourcing for relative wages for skilled workers in these three 
countries. We examine whether annual changes in nonproduction workers’ wages relative to 
production workers wages as a proxy for relative wages for skilled workers is negatively cor-
related with annual changes in outsourcing and other control variables (which are suppressed) 
in Austria and Germany and positively correlated in Poland. We indeed find this. 22  In the 
period 1991 to 2003 the annual growth rate of outsourcing as measured by the share of im-
ported inputs in percent of value added increased by 2.5 percent in Germany and by 5.8 per-
cent in Austria (1995 to 2002) and in Poland by 6.9 percent (1994 to 2002) as measured by 
the ratio of foreign to domestic assets. As can be seen from Figure 3 during the same period 
the annual growth rates of relative wages between skilled and unskilled workers was 0.21 
percent in Germany, -.29 percent in Austria, and 4.4 percent in Poland. Figure 3 gives the 
contribution of outsourcing to the annual changes in relative wages of skilled workers based 
on the Feenstra and Hanson regressions for these three countries. Outsourcing contributes 41 
                                                          
20 Austrian multinationals in particular to skill rich Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, the Czech Republic and 
Poland; German multinationals in particular to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Russia, and the Slovak Republic. 
21 In the Feenstra and Hanson (1996) model it is assumed that the US is the skill rich country and Mexico the 
labor rich country with US firms outsourcing of the labor intensive stages of production to Mexico leading to an 
increase in relative wages for skills in both countries.  Applying this model to Germany and Eastern Europe with 
Germany as the skill poor country and Eastern Europe as the skill rich country leads to the prediction that Ger-
man outsourcing to EE leads to a decline in relative wages for skills in both countries. To reconcile the model 
with the fact that relative wages for skills increased in Eastern Europe one has to assume exogenous differences 
in technology between the two countries and/or that the activity transferred is more skill intensive than the rest of 
the recipient economy, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996) for the stability conditions and relative wages. This pa-
per does not attempt to explain the evolution of the wag gap in Eastern Europe. To do so requires more careful 
analyses of each particular CEE country.  For example, Poland’s stark increase in the relative wage for skills 
appears to be induced by outsourcing investments from skill rich countries like France, the US and the Nether-
lands rather than Germany.  
22 For more details on the empirical results for Austria and Poland see Lorentowitcz, Marin, Raubold (2008) and 
for Germany see Marin and Raubold (2006). 
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percent in Germany, 36 percent in Austria, and 16 percent in Poland to the change in relative 
wages for skilled workers in these countries. In other words, in the absence of outsourcing 
relative wages for skilled workers would have increased by 41 percent more in Germany (in-
stead of increasing by 0.21 annually it would have increased by 0.30 percent annually), and 
relative wages for skilled workers would have declined by 36 percent less in Austria (instead 
of declining by 0.29 percent annually it would have declined by 0.18 percent annually). In 
Poland the relative wage would have increased by 3.7 percent rather than by 4.4 percent in the 
absence of outsourcing.       
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8. What Can Be Done? 
 
 
Can an R&D Subsidy Prevent the Exodus of Skilled Jobs? 
 
The governments in Germany and Austria might be tempted to address the problem of firms’ 
outsourcing of headquarter activity by subsidizing skill intensive activities in Germany and 
Austria. On December 19, 2003 Chancellor Schroeder declared in the public media that his 
government will meet the challenge of the loss of high skill jobs to offshore production to low 
wage countries by creating high skill jobs in Germany. The German labor unions IG Metall 
ask to make subsidies and public procurement projects contingent on local production Do 
these policies make sense? Are they desirable for the economy as whole? 23 
 
A subsidy on high skill intensive activity may as well make things worse when a country is 
faced with a human capital scarcity. By increasing the profitability of R&D activity, firms 
will increase their demand for high skilled labor exacerbating the scarcity of human capital.  
When the human capital constraint binds, the subsidy will result in a relative increase in 
skilled wages leading to a decline in manufacturing activity. The reason is that the subsidy 
induces the R&D sector to compete with the manufacturing sector for scarce skilled workers 
pushing up the wages for skills. The expansion of the R&D sector then crowds out the activity 
of the manufacturing sector. As a result the manufacturing sector contracts and the country 
end up with higher relative wages for skilled workers than before the R&D subsidy was intro-
duced. This unexpected result of a R&D subsidy is generated by the economy wide scarcity of 
human capital.24 
 
 
Liberalize the Movement of Skilled Workers with Eastern Enlargement 
 
If an R&D subsidy cannot help what actually can help?  If the governments in Germany and 
Austria care about where these skill intensive headquarter activities take place (and it might 
make sense to care about it) it needs to find a way to relax the constraint on human capital in 
the economy. There are two non exclusive ways to do this: to let skills come in from other 
countries, immigration and/or to produce more skills, education policy. As I have shown in 
the paper, human capital accumulation has dramatically slowed in the 1990s, in particular in 
Germany. Therefore, it is important to create an environment in which people find it attractive 
to invest in human capital. This requires letting relative returns to education to increase by 
introducing more flexible labor markets in which relative wages for skills can adjust to 
                                                          
23 See, Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 3, 2003.  To get a sense of the crisis felt in Germany consider the new 
proposal discussed in the social democratic party of  government Schroeder. On January 5, 2004 Schroeder de-
clared that he wants to meet the challenges ahead by creating 10 ivy league universities like Harvard and Stan-
ford in Germany. This sounds like revolution for a party with an egalitarian tradition typically opposed to any 
elitist ideas in particular in education. But the party still opposes tuition fees for students when Tony Blair’s 
labor government is introducing just that in British universities.  
24 For this counterintuitive effect of a R&D subsidy see Grossman and Helpman (1991). This effect of a R&D 
subsidy will be particularly prevalent in small countries with a small number of skilled workers. An example is 
Austria. The Austrian government pursued an active R&D policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the 
described unintended results, see Marin (1995). 
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changes in market conditions. The PISA study documented that Germany has a problem not 
only in the quantity of educated people it produces, but also in the quality of education.  Edu-
cation policy is now one of the central policy issues of the German government and rightly so. 
Focussing on the quantity of human capital produced, Koman and Marin (2000) show that the 
decline in the growth rate of human capital in the 1990s has come with the costs of  0.5 and 
0.3 percentages points less growth annually in Germany and Austria, respectively. These es-
timates calculate the direct growth effects of human capital but do not take into account po-
tential spillovers to the rest of the economy. If the scarcity of human capital leads corpora-
tions to outsource headquarter and R&D activities to other countries and these activities gen-
erate spillovers to the rest of the economy, then the scarcity of human capital may come with 
growth losses of  much larger size than  those obtained from a direct growth accounting calcu-
lation25 26 It is important to note, however, that firms’ outsourcing to Eastern Europe leads - 
like any form of economic integration – to an increase in welfare in both Austria and Ger-
many on the one hand and Eastern Europe on the other. 27  
 
But education policy will take time to change the skill endowment of a country. Immigration 
is definitely the faster way to deal with a human capital crisis. In Germany the Green Card for 
IT jobs is the first attempt to bring skills into the country. The German government is now 
discussing a new immigration law which will govern immigration under European Enlarge-
ment. Liberalizing the movement of high skilled labor with Eastern Enlargement would be 
desirable under these circumstances. The import of skilled workers from Eastern Europe 
would lower relative wages for skilled workers (assuming labor markets are allowed to adjust) 
and with it the cost of innovation in Germany. This will make it attractive for firms to under-
take these knowledge intensive activities in Germany rather than Eastern Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Indirect evidence that the outsourcing activities of German multinationals are producing such spillovers to the 
rest of the economy is Protsenko (2003). He estimates with the same firm survey data whether vertical and hori-
zontal FDI differ with respect to their spillover effects in the Czech Republic. He finds that German vertical FDI 
in the Czech Republic has positive effects on the productivity of local firms, while horizontal FDI does not have 
such effects. This stands in contrast with previous studies on FDI in the Czech Republic which typically find 
negative productivity effects of total FDI, not distinguishing between vertical and horizontal FDI. These positive 
spillovers from vertical FDI on a host country casts doubts on the previously held notion that offshore production 
is a ‘bad’ thing for an country receiving FDI. What appears to matter here is what kind of firm activity is out-
sourced to the host country.  
26 Coe and Helpman (1995) estimate international R&D spillovers and they find that it does matter economically 
where the R&D activity takes place. 
27  For the difference between welfare and growth in a global economy, see Grossman and Helpman (1991), for 
the welfare effects of outsourcing, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
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